APPEAL NO. 032193 FILED OCTOBER 7, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Te	xas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 401.001 et seq. (1989 Act).	A contested case hearing was held on July
24, 2003. The hearing officer resolved	the disputed issues by deciding that the
respondent's (claimant) date of injury (D	OI) is; that the claimant
sustained a compensable injury on	; and that the claimant had disability
from March 27 through May 27, 2003, and a	t no other time as of the date of the hearing.
The appellant (self-insured) appealed the	hearing officer's determinations based on
sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The a	ppeal file does not contain a response from
the claimant	

DECISION

Affirmed.

The claimant had the burden to prove that she sustained a compensable injury, the DOI, and that she has had disability. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). Whether a claimant was acting in the course and scope of her employment when she received an injury is a question of fact. Orozco v. Texas General Indemnity Co., 611 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ). In the present case, the hearing officer found that the claimant was still in the course and scope of employment at the time of her fall, because she had not left the employer's premises but was on her way to clock out which was an activity that had to do with and originated in the business affairs of employer. The hearing officer was persuaded by the claimant's testimony and medical evidence that she sustained a compensable injury with a DOI of ... and that she had disability from March 27 through May 27, 2003. The hearing officer could believe the claimant's evidence over the self-insured's assertions that the claim is a retaliation claim. Nothing in our review of the record indicates that the hearing officer's decision is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is (a self-insured governmental entity) and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

CR (ADDRESS) (CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).

CONCUR:
hada I. O. Damasa
Judy L. S. Barnes Appeals Judge
Chris Cowan
Appeals Judge